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California v. Hodari D.:

The Demise of the Reasonable Person

Test in Fourth Amendment Analysis

While the machinery of law enforcement and indeed the nature
of crime itself have changed dramatically since the Fourth
Amendment became part of the Nation's fundamental law in
1791, what the Framers understood then remains true today
that the task of combatting crime and convicting the guilty
will in every era seem of such critical and pressing concern
that we may be lured by the temptation of expediency into
forsaking our commitment to protecting individual liberty and
privacy. I
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
states that "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures

shall not be violated ... but upon probable cause .... ,,2 The
purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to provide a check on unrea-

sonable governmental intrusions of a person's privacy. 3 However,
while the Fourth Amendment affirmatively grants an individual "the
right to be left alone," ' 4 this right is not absolute.5 Only when

1. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 929-30 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. For purposes of this Note, discussions will be
limited to unreasonable seizures, specifically addressing the point at which a seizure
occurs. The reasonableness of a search is beyond the scope of this Note.
3. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (The principles embodied
in the Fourth Amendment "apply to all invasions on the part of the government and
its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the
breaking of his doors . . . but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal
security, personal liberty . . ").
4. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) ("[the] Fourth
Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy'. That
Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusions ... and often have nothing to do with privacy at all."); Tracey Maclin, The
Decline of the Right to Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75
CORNELL L. REv. 1258, 1260 (1990) (arguing that American citizens are losing their
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governmental intrusions reach a certain level is an individual's Fourth
Amendment rights violated. 6 Accordingly, not all governmental stops
constitute a seizure. 7 The United States Supreme Court has recognized
that some stops of citizens are outside the purview of the Fourth
Amendment. 8 Therefore, the personal security protected by the Fourth
Amendment is only relevant when the government's behavior falls
within the judicial definition of seizure.
Historically, the Supreme Court had held that an individual can
be seized either by physical restraint or a show of authority. 9 Over
the past decade the Supreme Court has struggled to perfect a test
which could consistently be applied in determining when a policecitizen encounter rises to a level of a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.' 0 The standard developed to determine whether a seizure
had occurred was whether, given all the circumstances, a reasonable
person would have felt free to leave." This test has become known
as the Fourth Amendment "reasonable person" test. 2 Under this test,
if the police-citizen encounter was determined to have been a seizure,
then the Fourth Amendment and its constitutionally-guaranteed protections are invoked.' 3

right to proceed throughout society without being stopped, and thereby effectively
losing their "right to locomotion").
5. See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text for an explanation of how
the Court in Terry balanced an individual's interest to remain free from intrusion
against law enforcement's interest to briefly question citizens.
6. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); see infra text accompanying
note 47.
7. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19. As discussed in the Terry decision, it is not a
seizure for an officer to approach a citizen and ask a few short questions. Such
activity was deemed necessary for effective police work. Id. at 22.
8. Terry, 392 U.S. at 10-12.
9. Id. at 19 n.16. See also infra text accompanying notes 58, 86 for examples
of actions which could constitute a show of authority sufficient to invoke the
protections of the Fourth Amendment.
10. See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989); Michigan v.
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573-74 (1988); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216-17
(1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 554 (1980). See infra notes 49-97 and accompanying text for a discussion
of these five cases.
11. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
12. Id.

13. The protections and remedies for violations of the Fourth Amendment as
previously stated are not the focus of this Note. However, one such protection of
procedural significance to the case of Californiav. HodariD., 111 S.Ct. 1547 (1991),
is the judicially created remedy for a violation of the Fourth Amendment known as
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In California v. Hodari D.,' 4 however, the Supreme Court departed from the "reasonable person" test and held that a policecitizen encounter amounted to a seizure only if the suspect, when
faced with a show of authority, yielded to that show of authority. 5
Although the Court in Hodari claimed that its holding can be harmonized with previous decisions regarding seizure, the requirement
that a suspect must yield to a show of authority undermines the spirit
of the "reasonable person" test.' 6 By requiring that a citizen must
yield, the holding in Hodari shifts the focus of inquiry from what a
reasonable person perceives to what a person does. In essence, the
Court concluded that a reasonable person, faced with an unreasonable
show of authority, must always yield to that show of authority in
order to be guaranteed constitutional protections. 7
A careful examination of Hodari demonstrates that the Court
utilized a novel definition of seizure; a definition inconsistent with
previous decisions. In analyzing the Hodari decision, Part II of this
Note will trace the origins of the Fourth Amendment and the Supreme
Court's previous holdings regarding seizures, including the "reasonable person" test. Part III will examine the facts, procedural history,
the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) ("the
[exclusionary] rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth

Amendment rights ...."). But see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928-48

(1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the exclusionary rule is implicitly part
of the Fourth Amendment, not a remedy to a Fourth Amendment violation). In
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Court employed the exclusionary
rule in holding that the Fourth Amendment forbids the use of evidence obtained
from an unreasonable search or seizure by a federal officer in a federal proceeding.
Id. at 392. The holding in Weeks was extended to apply to state searches and seizures
in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). However, if the evidence is discovered
prior to a "seizure," the evidence is considered to be abandoned and not a result of
the unreasonable governmental intrusion and, therefore, not will not be excluded as
evidence in the prosecution of the suspect. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1549.
14. 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991).
15. California v. Hodari D., 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1550 (1991).
16. Id. at 1551 ("We did not address ...

if the Mendenhall test was met -

if

the message that the defendant was not free to leave had been conveyed - a Fourth
Amendment seizure would have occurred."); cf. Thomas K. Clancy, The Supreme
Court's Search For a Definition of Seizure: What is a "Seizure" of a Person Within
The Meaning of The Fourth Amendment?, 24 AM. CRam. L. Rv. 619, 640-45 (1990)
(arguing that the decision in Mendenhall cannot be harmonized with any decision
which requires control to invoke the Fourth Amendment).
17. See Hodari D., 111 S.Ct. at 1551; cf. Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S.
499, 511 (1896) ("[Mlen who are entirely innocent do sometimes fly from the scene
of a crime through fear of being apprehended as the guilty parties, or from an
unwillingness to appear as witnesses.").
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and decision in Hodari. Part VI will scrutinize the holding to demonstrate the inconsistencies with previous Supreme Court decisions.
Finally, Part V will discuss the practical impact of the Hodari decision
upon future police-citizen encounters. This Note will conclude that
Hodari eliminated the reasonable person test, compelling citizens to
submit to unreasonable governmental intrusions in order to enjoy the
liberties granted under the Fourth Amendment.
II.

HISTORY OF DEFINING SEIZURE WITHIN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The literal definition of seizure has historically meant the taking
of physical control over an object."8 In contrast, the definition of
seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment has gone through
many changes.
A.

EARLY DEVELOPMENTS

The first discussion of the language in the Fourth Amendment
occurred in Boyd v. United States."9 In Boyd, the United States
Supreme Court held that compelling a suspect to produce private
documents to be used in a proceeding against him amounted to a
Fourth Amendment seizure.20 In pronouncing its decision, the Boyd
Court explained that although the practice of compelling production
of documents was not a governmental seizure in the literal sense, it
was necessary to define it as such in order to provide substance to
2
the protections of the Fourth Amendment. '

However, in Olmstead v. United States,2 2 the Court explained
that although the Fourth Amendment was to be construed liberally,
the Court could not "justify enlargement of the language.

' 23

In

Olmstead, the Court held that tapping of phone lines did not constitute
a seizure of evidence within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
18. HodariD., 111 S. Ct. at 1549 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 2057 (1981); 2 J.BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY 510 (6th ed. 1856); N.
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 67 (1828)).

19. 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).

20. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886).
21. Id. at 635 ("[Unconstitutional practices] can only be obviated by adhering
to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property
should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives [constitutional
provisions] of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right.").
22. 277 U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928).
23. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928); see also NELSON

B.

LASSON,' THE HISTORY

&

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
(1937).
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because it was not obtained by invasion but by the sense of hearing.4
The Olmstead Court held that a seizure was never anything short of
"actual physical invasion." 25 The language in Olmstead seems contradictory because it acknowledges that the Fourth Amendment is to be
construed liberally, yet employs the traditional dictionary definition
of seizure.2 6 Therefore, the question remained whether the Fourth
Amendment served to protect against unreasonable governmental
intrusions of a person's security or merely unreasonable physical
control of a person.
The rejection of the literal interpretations lay dormant in the
Supreme Court for thirty-three years before being resurrected in Katz
v. United States. 27 In Katz, the Court was called upon again to
determine whether a conversation overheard by FBI agents through a
listening device attached to a phone booth was protected under the
Fourth Amendment. 2 The Court announced that "the underpinnings
of Olmstead ... have been so eroded ... that the 'trespass' doctrine
there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling.' '29 In
rejecting the approach of Olmstead, the Court held that "the reach
of . . [the Fourth] Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or
absence of a physical intrusion ....,a
The issue framed in Katz was whether the FBI agents had intruded
into a sphere Katz sought to "preserve as private" thereby violating

24. Id. at 464.
25. Id. at 466. However, a powerful dissent by Justice Brandeis claimed that

the Court's decision did not liberally construe the Fourth Amendment, but instead
adhered to the literal definition of seizure. In response, Justice Brandeis contended
that "[t]ime and again this court, in giving effect to the principle underlying the
Fourth Amendment, has refused to place an unduly literal construction upon it." Id.
at 476 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also id. at 488 (Butler, J., dissenting) ("The
direct operation or literal meaning of the words used [in the Fourth Amendment] do
not measure the purpose or scope of its provisions.").
26. Id. at 471-80 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that constitutional protections should be invoked when one's personal security was violated, however a violation
of a person's security need not, in Brandeis' opinion, be determined solely upon
physical invasion).
27. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
28. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). While the Katz decision did
involve a search and not a seizure, the Court's pronouncements in the decision refer
to the broad protections guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment, not solely
protections against unreasonable searches. Id. at 350-53.
29. Id. at 353.
30. Id.; see also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (holding that
seizure was not based upon technical trespass, and included the recording of oral
statements).
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the Fourth Amendment by listening to the defendant's conversations
at a telephone booth.' In holding that a violation occurred, the Court
stated that the Fourth Amendment was concerned with personal
security, not physical invasion.3 2 The Court went to great lengths to
release the Fourth Amendment from its previous restrictive definition.33 Unfortunately, the conclusion that the Fourth Amendment was
violated upon a governmental intrusion into a sphere preserved as
private, was vague and arguably unworkable. 4 While the Katz Court
can be commended for refusing to confine the language of the Fourth
Amendment, the standard set forth in that decision seemed to have
done little to aid in the concrete determination of when a seizure
began.
Ironically, the lasting definition of seizure was first enunciated
by the Court in Terry v. Ohio." Although the main focus of the
Terry opinion concerned the level of suspicion needed for an investigatory stop, the Court set out the definition in dicta.3 6 In Terry, an
officer was on patrol and saw two men continually walking back and
forth on the street looking in a store window. The two men were
approached by another man, who spoke with them momentarily and
then proceeded around the corner. After ten or twelve minutes of
more pacing the two men proceeded around the same corner. The
officer, believing that the men were "casing" the store, followed the
men around the corner, approached the three men, and proceeded to
question the defendant Terry about his presence. After receiving a
31. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
32. Id. at 353 ( "[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people - and not simply
'areas' - against unreasonable searches and seizures .... "); see also Richard L.
Aynes, Note, Katz and The Fourth Amendment: A Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy, or A Man's Home is His Fort, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 63 (1974); Note, From
Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment
Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 968, 976 (1968) ("Katz clearly discarded the four
walls approach to constitutional privacy") [hereinafter Fourth Amendment Protection].
33. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (rejecting the Olmstead
analysis that the Fourth Amendment was only invoked upon governmental "trespass").
34. See Fourth Amendment Protection, supra note 32, at 976; Anthony G.
Amersterdman, Perspectives On the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 383
(1974) (arguing that while the terms "governmental intrusion" and "sphere of
privacy" purport to expand the Fourth Amendment, the vague nature of such terms
serves to evade the question of whether the activity in question was an invasion into
a citizen's privacy).
35. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
36. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
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mumbled response, the officer grabbed defendant Terry and searched
him and found a concealed gun." The issue the Court confronted was
whether both the officer's stop and subsequent search of Terry were
38
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court began its analysis by recognizing that the police had
an interest in making investigatory stops to protect against dangerous
situations which may be unfolding. 39 However, a citizen was still
40
guaranteed the protections against intrusions of liberty and security.
Balancing both interests the Court "reject[ed] the notions that the
Fourth Amendment does not come into play . . . if the officers stop
short of ...a 'technical arrest' or a 'full-blown search." ' ' 41 The Court
noted that "wheneyer a police officer accosts an individual and
restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person." ' 42
While the Court refused to hold that the officer's conduct was outside
the Fourth Amendment, it did hold that the officer had reasonable
suspicion to stop the men and after receiving the mumbled response
43
to seize Terry and perform a pat-down search.
Finally, in dicta, the Court defined seizure in words that since
have been used in Fourth Amendment cases during the past twenty
years. 44 The Court stated that "only when'the officer, by means of
physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the
liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred. ' 45
Throughout the Terry opinion the Court was reluctant to examine the
seizure issue through rigid analysis, fearing that such thinking "obscures the utility of limitations upon the scope, as well as the initiation,
37. Id. at 4-8.
38. Id. at 19 ("In this case there can be no question, then, that Officer

McFadden 'seized' petitioner .... We must decide whether at that point it was
reasonable . . ").

39. Id.at 10-11.
40. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1968).
41. Id.at 19.
42. Id.at 16. The Court also denounced the use of words such as 'stop' and
'frisk' to define investigatory procedures which arguably fell outside the Fourth
Amendment. Id.
43. Id. at 19, 28-31. Contra Maclin, supra note 4, at 1269 (questioning why
the Terry Court acknowledged that a seizure is accosting or restraining a person's
freedom, but then failed to examine whether the officer had seized the defendant
when he first approached the men).
44. See California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991); Brower v. County of
Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988); INS v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); United States
v.Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
45. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) (emphasis added).
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of police action as a means of constitutional regulation. '46 The point
of Terry, however, is that it recognized that a seizure should be
defined as the point upon which the citizen's liberties, guaranteed
4
under the Fourth Amendment, become intruded upon by the police. 1
In Terry the Court stated that seizure occurred by either physical
control or a show of authority. Physical control will always have a
restraining effect, thereby constituting a seizure even in the most
literal sense. However, a show of authority will not always restrain a
suspect. Under the Terry definition some form of restraint is necessary
to constitute a seizure. The most pressing question following Terry
was when a show of authority had a sufficient restraining effect so
as to constitute a seizure. The Terry Court's failure to define the
phrase "a show of authority" added to the confusion in determining
4
when a police-citizen encounter amounted to a seizure. 1
B.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE REASONABLE PERSON TEST

Left with the dicta in the Terry decision, Justice Stewart in
Mendenhall v. United States4 9 fashioned a test to determine when a
"show of authority" amounted to a seizure. In Mendenhall, two
DEA agents approached the defendant in an airport because she fit a
"drug courier" profile. 0 After examining her ticket and identification
and noticing that the names on the two did not match, the agents
asked the defendant to accompany them to their office for questioning. In the office, the agents asked the defendant if she would consent
to a search, to which she agreed. Finding nothing, the agent requested
a strip search to which the defendant protested, stating that she had
a plane to catch. Ultimately, the defendant did comply with the search
during which a bag of heroin was produced. 5 The issue in Mendenhall

46. Id. at 17.
47. Id. at 30; see Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line Seizures: The Need for
Clarity in Determining When Fourth Amendment Activity Begins, 79 J. CRIM L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 437, 438 (1989) (The author argues that the decision in Terry did little
more than define the "brief seizure" category and failed to provide "the precise
contours of the 'nonseizure' category .... ").
48. Later Court decisions offered limited groups of situations which could be
considered a "show of authority." See infra text accompanying notes 58, 86 for a
discussion of police activities which could constitute a "show of authority."
49. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
50. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 n.1 (1980); see generally
Stevens K. Bernstein, FourthAmendment - Using the Drug CourierProfile to Fight
the War on Drugs, 80 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 996 (1990).
51. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 546-49 (1980).
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was whether a seizure occurred when the DEA agents first approached

the defendant in the concourse of the airport.

2

Applying the dicta set forth in Terry," Justice Stewart found that
no seizure had occurred because there was no physical restraint or

show of authority. 4 Justice Stewart concluded that when the DEA
agents approached the defendant and questioned her, she had no
reason to believe that she was not free to walk away." In reaching
this determination, Justice Stewart focused on the fact that the
defendant was in a large public place, with the ability to disregard

the agent's questions and proceed along her way. 5 6 Therefore, no
seizure occurred prior to her accompaniment of the agents to the
office. Hence, a new test was created: "[A] person has been 'seized'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all
the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave." '5 7 Stewart set forth several
factors to be used in applying the reasonable person test: the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an

officer, physical touching, and language or tone of voice indicating
that compliance might be compelled. 8 In applying this new test, the
Court refused to consider the agents' intent when they approached
the defendant or to draw any inferences from the defendant's own

actions.5 9 Justice Stewart's "reasonable person" test was designed to
52. Id. at 551-57. This issue was only considered by Justices Stewart and
Rehnquist. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Blackmun and Powell did not join
Justice Stewart's opinion regarding when a seizure occurred. They held that the DEA
agents had the reasonable suspicion cause throughout the encounter. Id. at 560
(Powell, J., concurring). All five Justices agreed that the defendant voluntarily
consented to accompany the agents to the DEA office. Id. at 557-58.
53. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of Terry.
54. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
n
55. Id.
56. Id. at 554-56. Justice White, in his dissent, questioned how a reasonable
person could have felt free to leave and board a plane after having her ticket and
driver's license taken from her. Id. at 566 (White, J., dissenting); see also Clancy,
supra note 16, at 636-40; 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 9.2(h), at
404-05 (2d ed. 1987). Both Clancy and LaFave share Justice White's concern in
Mendenhall, and take it a step further, explaining that a reasonable person always
feels restricted when confronted by the police, and therefore never feels free to leave.
57. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)
58. Id.
59. Id at 554-56; see also LAFAVE, supra note 56, § 9.2(h), at 407-08 (discussing
how the Mendenhall test sought to be solely an objective analysis of the encounter
and explaining that the agent's intent in the encounter should not be the determining
factor in deciding whether the encounter amounted to a seizure).
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be objectively applied to the facts of the case. Only when the policecitizen encounter reached a level of intrusiveness intolerable to a
reasonable person, would the protections guaranteed under the Fourth
Amendment be invoked.
The reasonable person test quickly gained acceptance in a case
factually similar to Mendenhall. In Florida v. Royer,60 the defendant
was approached in an airport by two detectives because he fit the
drug courier profile. Upon stopping him the detectives asked for his
identification and ticket, and discovered a discrepancy between the
names on the ticket and on the identification. The detectives told him
they were narcotics agents, that they suspected him of drug trafficking,
and asked him to accompany them to a room. Without returning
Royer's ticket or identification, one detective led him to the room,
while the other retrieved his two pieces of luggage. The defendant
consented to the opening of one of the pieces, but claimed he did not
know the combination to the other. In order to search both cases the
detectives pried open the second piece of luggage. Marijuana was
6
found in both cases. '
Although the facts of Royer are genuinely similar to those in
Mendenhall, the Court, employing the same standard, arrived at
opposite results. 62 In Royer, the Court held that the defendant had
been the victim of an unreasonable seizure prior to the search of his
luggage.63 The Court acknowledged that when the detectives first
approached the defendant and asked for his ticket and identification,
their actions did not fall within the scope of a Fourth Amendment
seizure under Terry.6 However, when the detectives did not return
the defendant's items and placed him in a small room, the Court held
that, "[t]hese circumstances surely amounted to a show of official
authority such that a reasonable person would have believed he was
not free to leave." ' 65 Arguing the consistency of this opinion with
Mendenhall, the Court explained that in Royer the defendant's ticket
and identification were not returned, and his luggage was in control
60. 460 U.S. 491 (1983). While only a four justice plurality employed the
reasonable person test in finding that Royer had been seized, Justice Blackmun in
his dissent also adopted the reasonable person test, thereby establishing a majority
of the Court's adoption of the test. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 514 (1983)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 494-95.
62. Id. at 503 n.9.
63. Id. at 503.
64. Id. at 501.
65. Id. at 501-02.
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of the police. 66 Therefore, not only would a reasonable person have
not felt free to leave, but the defendant could not leave and board a
plane without his ticket. 67 As in Mendenhall, the Court in Royer did
not look to the intentions or perceptions of either the detectives or
the defendant. Upon a careful examination of only the facts, the
Court concluded that prior to the search, the actions of the detectives
had reached a level of intrusiveness invoking constitutional protections. 61
The Court in both Mendenhall and Royer applied the reasonable
person test to a seizure based upon the show of authority. 69 The
central issue the Court was faced with when applying the reasonable
person test was when a show of authority reached a sufficient level
to make a reasonable person, given all the circumstances, conclude
that she was not free to leave. 70 Justice Stewart, in his opinion in
Mendenhall, suggested that the threatening presence of several officers, display of a weapon by an officer, physical touching, and
language or tone of voice indicating that compliance might be com66. Id. at 503 n.9.
67. Id. The Court also noted that at no time did the officers explain to the the
defendant that he was free to leave. Id. at 501.
68. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 504-05 (1983). But see Clancy, supra note
16, at 632 n.88 (arguing that the nature of the encounter in Royer was not a seizure
based upon show of authority, but effectively was a seizure based on physical control
due to the retention of Royer's luggage, his identification, and his ticket).
69. In Mendenhall, the Court held that when the agents approached the
defendant and questioned her, it was not a sufficient show of authority to enable her
to reach the conclusion that she was not free to leave. See supra notes 53-59 and
accompanying text. In Royer, the Court determined that the defendant was seized
when the detectives withheld his tickets and luggage, and placed him in a small room,
because such a show of authority would have made a reasonable person feel that he
was not free to leave. See also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984). In an attempt
to search for illegal aliens, INS agents, without a warrant, entered a factory where
the defendants worked and moved throughout the workplace questioning the workers
on their citizenship and asking some workers to produce proof of citizenship. Agents
were also stationed at the exits of the factory. Arrests were made if the subject was
an illegal alien. Id. at 212-13. The factory workers argued that the presence of the
agents effectively seized the entire work force. The Court dismissed this argument
claiming that the worker's freedom to leave was not restricted by the agents but by
the obligation of work. Id. at 218-19.
70. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 228 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) Advocating the reasonable person test, Brennan wrote: "[the] rule properly looks not to
the subjective impressions of the person questioned but rather to the objective
characteristics of the encounter which may suggest whether or not a reasonable person
would believe that he remained free . . . to disregard the questions and walk away."
Id.
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pelled were examples of police actions which might give rise to a
seizure under the reasonable person test. 7 In Royer, the Court stated
that the mere approach and initial questioning of the' defendant was
not a seizure based upon a show of authority.7 2 When read together
both opinions suggest, as did Terry, that a seizure based upon show
of authority requires more than simple questioning or a non-threatening approach by a police officer.73 Following Royer it was clear
that when determining when a seizure based on a show of authority
occurred, the analysis must focus on a reasonable person's objective
74
perceptions of the encounter.
In Michigan v. Chesternut," seven members of the Court joined
the majority opinion in its strict application of the reasonable person
test. Justice Kennedy's concurrence, however, did not adopt the
language of the reasonable person test. Instead, his seizure analysis
76
focused upon control.
The encounter in Chesternut began when four police officers,
routinely patrolling in a marked police car, noticed a man get out of
a car and approach the defendant who was standing on a corner.
Upon seeing the patrol car the defendant turned and began to run.
The officers pursued the defendant, drove along side him and witnessed the defendant discard a number of packets which turned out
to be codeine pills.77 The defendant proceeded only a few more paces
before the police apprehended him. The issue in Chesternut was
71. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); see supra text
accompanying note 58.
72. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501 (1983) ("Asking for and examining
Royer's ticket and his driver's license were no doubt permissible in themselves . . ").
73. In Delgado the Court stated that "[unless the circumstance of the encounter
are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed
he was not free to leave if he had not responded, one cannot say that the individual
question resulted in a detention under the Fourth Amendment." Delgado, 466 U.S.
at 216 ; see also 3 LAFAVE, supra note 56, § 9.2(h), at 408-18. Professor LaFave
noted that questioning will not, under the reasonable person test, constitute a seizure.
However, he suggested that employing the reasonable person test to mean that a
person is always seized when they feel they are not free to walk away is too literal a
reading. Such a standard, he contended, would make almost every encounter a
seizure. He believed that people do not generally feel free to walk away from police
when encountered. Id. at 408-18.
74. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) marked the first time that the entire
court adopted the reasonable person test.
75. 486 U.S. 567 (1988).
76. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 576-77 (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that a seizure occurs only when there is a restraining effect).
77. Id. at 569-70.
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"whether the officers' pursuit of respondent constituted a seizure
implicating the Fourth Amendment protections .... "I'
The Court rejected the arguments of both the defendant and the
state as to the applicable test for determining when a seizure occurred.
The state argued that "the Fourth Amendment is never implicated
until an individual stops in response to

. .

. [a] show of authority." 7 9

Conversely, the defendant contended that any pursuit by the police
implicated the Fourth Amendment.80 In rejecting both approaches,
the Court announced that "their attempts to fashion a bright-line rule
applicable to all investigatory pursuits, have failed to heed this Court's
clear direction ..

.

The Court in Chesternut proceeded to base its analysis upon the
"reasonable person" test. The Court concluded that the defendant
was not seized during the police pursuit.82 In its holding, the Court
explained that the police pursuit could not have communicated to a
reasonable person that they would be captured or their movement
would be restricted. 3 The Court took great stock in the fact that the
police pursuit was performed in a nonaggressive manner, with the
police merely driving alongside the defendant. 84 The Court, in holding
that no seizure had occurred, stated that "[tihe test is necessarily
imprecise, because it is designed to assess the coercive effect of police
conduct, taken as a whole .... "-85 Similar to the opinion in Mendenhall, the Court provided examples of situations in which an encounter
with the police might constitute a seizure: police activating sirens;
pursuing; commanding suspect to halt; or displaypolice aggressively
86
weapons.
ing
78. Id. at 572.
79. Id.

80. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572 (1988).
81. Id.

82. Id. at 575 ("[T]he police conduct involved here would not have communicated to the reasonable person an attempt to capture or otherwise intrude upon
respondent's freedom of movement.").
83. Id.
84. Id. ("The record does not reflect that the police activated a siren ...

or

commanded respondent to halt, or displiyed any weapons."). But see Maclin, supra
note 4, at 1306-07 (arguing that the Court in Chesternut was condoning police chases
in the streets even where the police lacked probable cause, and stating that "[p]erhaps
the result in Chesternut [wals due to the fact that none of the Justices ha[d] been
recently chased down public streets by a police car ....

).

85. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988); see also id. at 572 (where
the Court refused to adopt a "bright-line" rule in police-citizen encounters).
86. Id. at 574-75.
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Justice Kennedy concurred with the result the Court reached in
Chesternut but approached the question of seizure differently than
the majority.8 7 His concurrence is important in that his analysis of
the Chesternut encounter sets the stage for the result in Hodari.
Justice Kennedy stated that "[t]he case before us presented an opportunity to consider whether even an unmistakable show of authority
can result in a seizure of a person who attempts to elude apprehension ... *"88 He explained that, "whether or not the officers' conduct
communicate[d] to a person a reasonable belief that they intend to
apprehend him. . . does not implicate Fourth Amendment protections
until it achieves a restrainingeffect.' '89
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Chesternut proposed
that seizure analysis should focus on restraint of the suspect. 9° He
asserted that a seizure, based upon a show of authority will only
result when the show of authority has a "restraining effect." 9' The
oddity of the concurring opinion is that it seems to deny the Court's
rejection of the premise that "the Fourth Amendment is never implicated until an individual stops in response to the polices' show of
authority." 92
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Chesternut acquired
more credence in Brower v. County of Inyo.93 The issue in Brower
was whether the conduct of the police in setting up a roadblock
constituted a seizure. 94 While the Court found that the roadblock was
a sufficient show of authority to constitute a seizure, the dicta in the
Court's opinion announced that a "[v]iolation of the Fourth Amendment requires an intentional acquisition of physical control." 95 Justice
87. Id. at 576-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion was joined by only Justice Scalia.
88. Id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
89. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 575-76 n.9. As if to respond to Justice
Kennedy's concurrence, the majority noted that there are some circumstances in
which a police pursuit will amount to a seizure. However, the majority explained,
this type of case was not before the Court, and should be left to another day. Id.
90. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 576-77 (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
91. Id. ("[Conduct does not implicate Fourth Amendment protections until it
achieves a restraining effect.").
92. Id. at 572.
93. 489 U.S. 593 (1989) (This case was a civil action against the county alleging
that the police conduct amounted to an unreasonable seizure, causing the decedent's
death. The police chased the decedent for 20 miles before setting up a hidden
roadblock. The decedent crashed into the roadblock and died.).
94. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 594-95 (1989).
95. Id. at 596. The Brower Court proceeded to explain that "[A] Fourth
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Stevens, concurring, disagreed with the above dicta. He believed that
while physical control is typical of most seizures, he "[was] not
"9
entirely sure that it is an essential element of every seizure ....
Furthermore, Steven's concurrence criticized the Court's dicta as
"decid[ing] a number of cases not before the Court . . . ."9 As the
Supreme Court left the 1980's, Justice Kennedy's concurrence in
Chesternut, seemingly denounced by a majority of the Court, along
with the Court's dicta in Brower, eluded to yet another twist the
Court would apply to the definition of seizure. While the reasonable
person test had not been outright rejected by the Court, the notion
that "intentional acquisition of physical control" was a necessary
element of a seizure arguably shifted the focus of seizure analysis
away from the perceptions of the citizen to the actions of both the
citizen and police during the encounter.
III.
A.

CALIFORNIA V. HODARI

D.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Late one evening, two police officers assigned to a drug task
force were patrolling in a high-crime area of Oakland in an unmarked
police car. Although dressed in street clothes, the officers were wearing
blue jackets with "police" printed on the front and back. As the
officers patrolled the area they noticed a group of youths standing
around a parked car. Upon sighting the officers, the youths fled in
different directions. Becoming suspicious, one officer followed in the
car while Officer Pertoso took off on foot. Officer Pertoso took a
circuitous route in chasing the youths, whereupon he spotted Hodari.
Hodari, although running directly at Officer Pertoso, was unaware
of the officer's presence because he was looking back over his
shoulder. Not until the two were within eleven feet of one another
did the defendant turn his head to see Pertoso. Upon seeing Pertoso,
Hodari discarded a single loose rock in an underhand motion. Pertoso
Amendment seizure does not occur whenever there is a governmentally caused
termination of an individual's freedom of movement ... only when ... [it is]
through means intentionally applied." Id. at 596-97 (emphasis in original). The
Court, in reference to a hypothetical used by the appellate court, acknowledged that
the pursuit of the suspect was not in itself a seizure. Id.
96. Id. at 600 (Stevens, J., concurring).
97. Id. (commenting on the Court's statement that a seizure required intentional
acquisition of physical control); see also Clancy, supra note 16, at 640-46 (noting
that the dicta regarding whether the pursuit was a seizure, was unnecessary because
the decedent was controlled when he hit the roadblock).
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tackled Hodari, forced him to the ground, and handcuffed him. 98

Thereafter, Pertoso retrieved the rock he saw Hodari discard,

which was later determined to be cocaine. The other officer retraced
the route to where the officers originally had seen the group of youths

near the car, and found a plastic sandwich bag with fifteen rocks of
what was later found to be cocaine. 99
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In a juvenile proceeding for possession of cocaine, Hodari filed
a motion to suppress all the physical evidence seized by way of his

arrest. 00 The trial court held that the chase of Hodari was illegal
because the police did not have a reasonable basis for pursuing him.' 0'
However, the trial court was unable to find any nexus between the
police officers' illegal chase and the evidence. 02 In its holding, the
trial court distinguished between actual detention and threatened
detention, noting that actual detention did not occur until Hodari had
discarded the rock. 03 Therefore, the trial court dismissed Hodari's

motion to suppress the cocaine.'°4
On appeal, the appellate court reversed, thus suppressing the
cocaine as a fruit of an illegal seizure. 05 In its opinion the appellate
court focused on three issues. First, the court considered whether
Hodari had been seized when he saw Pertoso running towards him.'°6
Applying the test set forth in Mendenhall, the court stated that:
We have no doubt that it is coercive and intimidating to

discover a police officer running directly towards one, some

98. In re Hodari D., 265 Cal. Rptr. 79, 81 (1989) (Although the officers were
suspicious upon seeing the youths flee, at no time did they see an exchange of money,
drugs or any other items.); Brief for Petitioner at 12-14, California v. Hodari D.,
111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991) (No. 89-1632); Brief for Respondent at 9-11, California v.
Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991) (No. 89-1632); see also HodariD., 111 S. Ct. at
1549.
99. In re Hodari D., 265 Cal. Rptr. 79, 81 n.1 (1989) (noting that upon
searching the defendant the officers also found a pager and $130.00).
100. See Brief for Petitioner at 14-15, California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547
(1991) (No. 89-1632); Brief for Respondent at 12-13, California v. Hodari D., Ill S.
Ct. 1547 (1991) (No. 89-1632).
101. In re Hodari D., 265 Cal. Rptr. 79, 81-82 (1989) (quoting the trial judge,
"I'm not concerned with the illegality of the chase on these facts. I think this was
clearly illegal. The cops had no reasonable basis for doing what they did .. .
102. Id. at 82.
103. Id. at 82 n.2.
104. Id. at 81.
105. In re Hodari D., 265 Cal. Rptr. 79, 86 (1989).
106. Id. at 82.
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[eleven] feet away on a public sidewalk. Indeed, the sight of
a running officer ... would reasonably convince most citizens
that they were not free to ignore the officer and leave. 07
Responding to the State's argument that a seizure did not occur until
there was actual physical control of the suspect, the court held that
physical restraint was not required to constitute a seizure.108 Furthermore, the court contended that even if physical restraint was required,
the direct pursuit by Pertoso amounted to physical restraint. 01 9
Second, the court examined whether the seizure was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment."10 The court had little trouble concluding that the officer's chase was unreasonable. It held that Hodari's
flight, without specific knowledge, did not constitute reasonable suspicion to pursue and detain him."' The court explained that "[tihe
factors of nighttime, high drug activity in the area, and seeking to
avoid the police were ... insufficient to justify detention ....I 112
Finally, the court found that the discarding of the cocaine was a
direct result of the illegal pursuit." 3 Therefore, absent any intervening
circumstances between the illegal pursuit and the abandonment, the
4
evidence obtained must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule."
The State, upon having its appeal to the California Supreme
Court denied, appealed to the United States Supreme Court, asserting
that the cocaine was not a fruit of the unreasonable seizure. The State
argued that prior to Officer Pertoso tackling Hodari no seizure had
occurred, hence no violation of the Fourth Amendment." 5 Due to the
inconsistency regarding when a person has been seized, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. The issue to be decided was 6whether Hodari
had been seized at the time he dropped the cocaine."
107. Id. at 83.
108. Id. at 84 (The Court rejected the State's argument that Brower v. County
of Inyo required that physical control was necessary to constitute a seizure, arguing
that the Brower decision required that the seizure required an intentional act on
behalf of the police.); see supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Brower holding.
109. Id. at 84 n.4.
110. In re Hodari D., 265 Cal. Rptr. 79, 84 (1989).
111. Id. at 84-85.
112. Id. (citing People v. Alridge, 674 P.2d 240 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)).
113. Id. at 85 ("Where the police illegality involved is running head on at a
suspect in an effort to stop him, we cannot see how the suspect's immediate discard
of contraband can be anything other than a direct result of and exploitation of the
illegality.").
114. Id.

115. California v. Hodari D., III S. Ct. 1547, 1549 (1991).
116. Id.
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THE COURT DECIDES THAT NO SEIZURE OCCURRED

The Court began its opinion by examining the common law
definition of seizure. Acknowledging that the Fourth Amendment
applied to a seizure of a person,' 1 7 the Court cited to several dictionary
definitions in support of its view that "the word 'seizure' has meant
a 'taking of possession."'"" Looking to the common law, the Court
stated that a seizure encompassed more than just applying physical
force; it required that the object being seized be brought within
physical control.' 19
After defining seizure as an action requiring physical control, the
Court seemingly took a step back and recognized that activity short
of physical control may implicate Fourth Amendment protections. 2 0
For example, an arrest can be effectuated through mere touching. 12
The Court immediately noted that at common law if the suspect broke
away from the officer's touch, there was no continuing arrest.'2
Henceforth, any subsequent discard of evidence following the escape
was not "during the course of an arrest."' 2 3 The Court acknowledged
that if an unlawful common law seizure occurred, then the suspect
broke away, and discarded evidence, the discarded evidence would
not be the product of an unlawful seizure but rather discarded at the
suspect's own will. 24 The Court explained that they had "consulted
117. Id.

118. Id. at 1549-50 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
2057 (1981); 2 BOUVIER, supra note 18, at 510; WEBSTER, supra note 18, at 67).
119. California v. Hodari D., III S.Ct. 1547, 1549-50 (1991). To support this
proposition the Court stated that "[a] ship still fleeing, even though under attack,
would not be considered to have been seized as a war prize." Id. at 1550 (citing The
Josef Segunda, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 312 (1825)). Hodari D. noted that to effectuate
a common law arrest, the "quintessential 'seizure of the person' under the Fourth
Amendment," no actual control was needed. Hodari D., at 1550.
120. HodariD., 111 S.Ct. at 1550.
121. Id. (citing A. CORNELIUS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 163-64 (2d ed. 1930)
(explaining that an arrest can be effectuated by a constructive detention when there
is merely touching without exercising physical control over the suspect "even for an
instant")).
122. Id. ("To say that an arrest is effected by the slightest application of physical
force . . .is not to say that for Fourth Amendment purposes there is a continuing
arrest during the period of fugitivity.") (emphasis in original).
123. Id. (citing Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 471 (1874) ("A
seizure is a single act, and not a continuous fact.")).
124. Id. Justice Stevens, in dissent, believed that if an officer touches a suspect,
and then the suspect drops evidence, the evidence will be a fruit of the unlawful
arrest and inadmissible. Hodari D., 111 S.Ct. at 1553 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
This proposition fails to recognize the majority's claim that there is no continuing
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the common-law to explain the meaning of seizure - and, . .. to
expand rather than contract that meaning (since one would not
normally think that the mere touching of a person would suffice).' 25
After sketching the parameters of a common law seizure, the
Court reiterated that "[tihe present case, however, is even one step
further removed [than a common law arrest],"' 26 since the present
case did not involve the application of any physical force.' 27 Therefore, the focus was whether the officer's pursuit equalled a show
of authority. 2 ' The Court accepted that such a pursuit was a show
of authority, but questioned "whether, with respect to a show of
authority . . . a seizure occurs even though the subject does not
yield."' 29 The Court answered that it did not. Therefore, Hodari's
failure to submit to Pertoso's show of authority in no way constituted a seizure. 3 0 The Court reasoned that an arrest, while not
requiring touching, cannot occur solely through words.' 3 ' Thereseizure, without
fore, the only logical conclusion is that an arrest 3or
2
authority.1
to
submission
include
must
touching,
The Court in Hodari D., to further substantiate its decision
that a suspect must yield to a show of authority in order to be
seized, relied on public policy grounds. To conclude otherwise, the
Court argued, would be to encourage disobedience of an officer's

arrest for purposes of the Fourth Amendment; therefore, the majority claims that
no Fourth Amendment protections exist beyond the touching which constituted the
arrest. Id. at 1550.
125. Id. at 1550 n.2 (responding to the dissent's contention that at common law
attempted seizures were also unlawful).
126. California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1550 (1991).
127. Id. The Hodari D. Court stated that a common-law arrest occurred through
"the mere grasping or application of physical force with lawful authority" regardless
of whether the physical force subdued the suspect. Id.
128. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) which defined seizure
as either physical force or a show of authority).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1550-51 (The Court analogized this case to a situation in which an
officer is yelling "halt" at a fleeing suspect. In their view, neither constitutes a
seizure.). But see United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) ("Examples
of circumstances that might indicate a seizure [include] . . . use of language or tone
of voice indicating that compliance with the officers request might be compelled.").
131. California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1550 (1991) (explaining that "a
policeman yelling '[s]top, in the name of the law!' at a fleeing form that continues
to flee" was not a seizure).
132. Id. (citing Rollin M. Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IowA L. Rv. 201,
206 (1940)).
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command.' 33 The Court wished to establish a policy in which
citizens would always submit to police orders. The Court believed
this to be a positive public policy "since the addressee has no ready
' 4
means of identifying the deficient [orders].'
After relying upon a common-law definition of seizure, the
Court proceeded to discount its prior decisions regarding when a
seizure occurred. Hodari argued that the "reasonable person" test

set forth in Mendenhall v. United States'35 supported his contention
that he was seized when he discarded the cocaine.' 36 While the
Court acknowledged the existence of the test set forth in Mendenhall, it explained that Hodari failed to read the Mendenhall test
properly.' 37 The Court read the Mendenhall test to say "that a
person has been seized 'only if' [the Mendenhall test is met], not
that he has been seized 'whenever' [the Mendenhall test is
met] ... ."I's In other words, the Mendenhall test "states a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for a seizure . . . effected

through a 'show of authority."

' 31 9

The Court also rejected Hodari's reliance upon Michigan v.
Chesternut140 to support his position that he was seized when

confronted with the officer's head-on pursuit.' 4' The Court claimed
that Chesternut offered no support because the holding in Chesternut was based on the position that the Mendenhall test was not
133. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1551 ("Unlawful orders will not be deterred,
moreover, by sanctioning through the exclusionary rule those of them that are not
obeyed.") (emphasis in original). Presumably, the Court believed that if a show of
authority absent submission could be a seizure, then suspects being chased by the
police on foot or in cars, or being confronted by police officers with their weapons
out, would either continue to flee or begin to flee. Upon fleeing, the suspect would
presumably have been encouraged to discard any incriminating evidence.
134. Id.
135. 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) ("[A] person has been 'seized' within the meaning

of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding
the incident, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave.").
136. California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991); see In re Hodari,
265 Cal. Rptr. 79, 83 (1989) (holding that, by way of the Mendenhall test, Hodari
was seized).
137. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1551 ("In seeking to rely upon that test here,
respondent [Hodari] fails to read it carefully.").
138. Id.
139. Id. (emphasis in original).
140. 486 U.S. 567 (1988).
141. California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991) (discussing Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion in Chesternut, which claimed that the Fourth Amendment may not be implicated prior to physical restraint).
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met.' 4 2 The Court explained, "[w]e did not address in Chesternut,
however, the question whether, if the Mendenhall test was met if the message that the defendant was not free to leave had been
' 43
conveyed - a Fourth Amendment seizure would have occurred." '
Alternatively, the Court felt that the holding in Brower v. County
of Inyo 44 was relevant to the present case, since in Brower the
Court "did not even consider the possibility that a seizure could
have occurred during the course of the chase because
' 45
authority did not produce his stop.'

. . .

show of

The Court's opinion in Hodari D. is unusual in its attempt to
define the point at which a police-citizen encounter becomes a seizure.
First, the Court defined a Fourth Amendment seizure by relying on
the common-law definitions of seizure and arrest, both of which
required physical restraint. Once defined, the Court expanded the
definition to include "show of authority." Applying the facts of the
case, the Court held that the pursuit of Hodari D. would not fit into
the definition of seizure and therefore was outside the scope of the
Fourth Amendment. The Court announced its approach was not only
logical, but perpetuated necessary public policy goals. Finally, the
Court distinguished its precedents and concluded that the proposition
that a suspect must yield to a show of authority before invoking the
protections of the Fourth Amendment was consistent with previously
enunciated standards? 46

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE HODARI
The Court in Hodari D. announced that
stretch the Fourth Amendment beyond its
meaning of arrest."' 14 However, what the

D. DECISION

47

it was not prepared "to
words and beyond the
Court did instead was

142. Id.
143. Id. (citing Michigan v. Chesternut 486 U.S. 567, 577 (1988) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
144. 489 U.S. 593 (1989); see supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Brower opinion.
145. California v. Hodari D., III S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991). The Court also
makes an obscure reference to Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) in which
it was held that during police pursuit there was no seizure of whiskey because the
jugs were recovered after being discarded by the defendants. Hester v. United States,
265 U.S. at 58-59.
146. See supra notes 133-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
"yield" requirement.
147. See generally 3 LAFAVE, supra note 56, § 9.2(h) (Professor LaFave's
supplement, which was released after the writing of this Note, engages in an extensive
discussion of inconsistencies between California v. Hodari D. and previous decisions.).
148. California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991).
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confine the Fourth Amendment to a definition which fails to acknowledge a majority of recent case law. Applying the Fourth Amendment,
the Court in Hodari D. felt compelled to first define "seizure."
Ironically, most of the authority the Court cited in defining seizure
was outdated. 49 Instead of searching back to the nineteenth century
for a definition, the Court could have gone back only twenty-four
years to Terry v. Ohio.15 0 In Terry, the Court did not define the term
"seizure" in an abstract sense, but defined it in terms of police-citizen
encounters."' This approach seems more logical than the approach
taken in Hodari D., since the protections guaranteed in the Fourth
Amendment only arise during police-citizen encounters. 5 2 The Court's
use of dictionary definitions and common law effectively replaced the
constitutional meaning of seizure with common law usage. 53
It was only later in the Hodari D. opinion that the Court
recognized that the current definition of a seizure encompassed a
seizure not recognized at common law - a seizure by a show of
authority. 5 4 One must wonder why the Court would first go to great
lengths to discuss seizures based upon physical control when the only
issue in Hodari D. was whether seizure was effectuated through a

149. See supra notes 118,119 and 123; see also Mary Coombs, Constable Given
Free Rein, N.J. L.J. , Aug. 29, 1991, at 72 ("Scalia did not explain precisely the
relevance of that common law definition to the meaning of the constitutional term.").
150. The Court in HodariD. did cite to the decision in Terry in recognition that
a show of authority may constitute a seizure. However, this portion of the opinion,
instead of being the starting point for defining seizure, came only after the Court's
inquiry into the common-law definition of seizure. California v. Hodari D., 111 S.
Ct. 1547, 1550 (1991). Contra Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1988)
(where the Court began its analysis of seizure first with the definition put forth in
Terry and then the test pronounced in Mendenhall); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491
(1983) (no mention in the opinion of the common law definition of seizure); United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551-53 (1980) (introducing the definition of
seizure by discussing Terry.).
151. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
152. If one citizen were to wrongfully grab, accost, search, frisk or otherwise
detain another citizen or another's property there would be no constitutional violation
because the Fourth Amendment only protects against governmental intrusions. U.S.
CoNsT. amend. IV.

153. Compare California v. Hodari D., Il1 S. Ct. at 1554 (Stevens, J., dissent-

ing) (questioning whether common law "define[s] the scope of the outer boundaries
of the constitutional protections," Stevens argued that the majority's narrow definition of seizure was rejected in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)) with
California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1551 n.3 (where the majority argued that its
definition of seizure does not undermine Katz because its definition only applies to
seizure of a person, and Katz involved seizure of telephone conversation).
154. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1550 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967)).
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show of authority." The Court's strategy in defining seizure may
have been in anticipation of the dissent's criticism that the holding in
HodariD. would contract rather than expand the definition of seizure.
By first defining seizure in common-law terms and then including the
"show of authority" prong of seizure, the Hodari D. opinion can be

read to expand the definition of seizure. However, such a reading
would be flawed since seizure by a "show of authority" was first
enunciated in Terry and has been recognized as a part of the seizure
56
definition since the Terry decision.

Before discussing seizure based upon a show of authority the

Court examined the common law definitions of arrest.5 7 During this
portion of the Hodari D. opinion the Court effectively decided that
the seizure of Hodari could not have occurred until he was tackled.
Explaining that a seizure may occur by a mere application of force,
the Court recognized that an arrest, "[the] quintessential 'seizure of
the person' under our Fourth Amendment,"' ' 8 may be "effected by
the slightest application of force .

. . .

19 The Court, however, was

quick to point out that there is no such thing as a continuing arrest,
and therefore, there can be no such thing as a continuing seizure.160
Concurrently, the Court explained that any evidence discarded

after an unlawful touch, which does not serve to control the suspect,
could not be not a product or result of that touch. 6 Immediately
155. HodariD., 111 S. Ct. at 1549-50. Furthermore, by searching and struggling
to define seizure through literal construction, the Court ignored the proclamation by
Justice Bradley in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) that the Fourth
Amendment is to be construed liberally in order to guarantee full constitutional
protections. Id. at 635; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 476 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that seizure is to be liberally construed); Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 488 (1928) (Butler, J., dissenting).
156. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. The Court also noted that it
consulted the common law definitions to "expand rather than contract" the meaning
of seizure. California v. Hodari D., 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1550 n.2 (1991).
157. See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text for the Court's discussion
of common law arrests.
158. HodariD., 111 S.Ct. at 1550.
159. Id. Physical control, therefore, is not a necessity.
160. Hodari D., 111 S.Ct. at 1550. The Court's discussion of continuing arrest
arguably has two purposes. First, as the Court points out, if the officer had seized
Hodari, and Hodari had broken away then discarded the cocaine, the cocaine could
still have been admitted as evidence. Id. Second, an acknowledgement that there is
no continuing seizure bolsters the Court's holding that the pursuit of Hodari was not
a seizure, since "the present case ... is even one step further removed." Id.; see

also supra note 119.
161. HodariD., 111 S.Ct. at 1550 ("If, for example, Pertoso had laid his hands
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following this assertion, the Court pronounced that "[tihe present

case, however, is even one step further removed [from a case in which
the suspect breaks free from an unlawful touch]. ' 162 The Court
reasoned that because evidence discarded after an unlawful touch, not
submitted to, can be admitted against the suspect, evidence discarded
after an unlawful show of authority, to which the suspect does not
yield, can also be admitted. 163 The Court's reasoning is flawed because

it failed to recognize that when an unlawful act leads to the discovery

of evidence, such evidence may be considered "tainted" and inadmissible. 164

Not only did the HodariD. Court fail to acknowledge the premise

that an illegal act can taint evidence, thereby rendering it inadmissible,
it also failed to follow the holding in Florida v. Royer. 65 The Court
in Royer held that when Royer consented to the opening of his

luggage, there was no break between his consent and the unlawful
seizure. 166 The Royer holding was based on the idea that the coercive
effect of an unlawful show of authority brought about Royer's
consent. 167 Consistent with this thinking is the argument that the
upon Hodari to arrest him, but Hodari had broken away and had then cast away
the cocaine, it would hardly be realistic to say that the disclosure had been made
during the arrest.").
162. Id. at 1550.
163. It is important to restate that the police pursuit of Hodari was not based
on any reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Id. at 1549 n.l; see also In re Hodari
D., 265 Cal. Rptr. 79, 84 (1989) ("Respondent [state] does not dispute the trial
court's finding that the police had no reasonable cause to chase or detain the
appellant.").
164. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (Where the
Court held that narcotics which were discovered due to a an earlier illegality were
inadmissible because they were "tainted" by the prior illegality such evidence is the
"fruit of a poisonous tree."); see also California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547,
1553-54 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (chiding the majority for utilizing the common
law arrest to define a Constitutional provision, yet failing to acknowledge the
definition of common law attempted arrest, which provided remedy for unlawful
police attempt to arrest).
165. 460 U.S. 491 (1983). The Hodari D. Court's only reference to Royer was
in a string cite in which it recognized the existence of the reasonable person test. See
California v. Hodari D., Ill S. Ct. at 1551 (1991).
166. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507-08 (1983) ("[T]he consent [to search

his luggage] was tainted by the illegality .

. . .");

see also Wong Sun v. United States,

371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (holding that unlawful police activities "taint" later
discoveries).
167. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507-508 (1983). Contra Clancy, supra note
16, at 632 n.88 (arguing that Royer's detention was effectively taking physical control,
and therefore the consent to search was given while he was under the physical control
of the detective).
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coercive effect of an unlawful touch, or an unlawful show of authority, could bring about the discarding of evidence. However, under the
rationale employed by the Court in Hodari D., any subsequent
movement following a violation of a citizen's constitutional rights will
1 68
eliminate all constitutional protections until the movement ceases.
Dismissing the idea that an unlawful touch may bring about the
discarding of evidence, the Hodari D. Court completely rejected the
notion that an unlawful pursuit, not yielded to, could ever be coercive
1 69
enough to bring about the discarding of evidence.
Finally, the Hodari D. Court acknowledged Hodari's assertion
that the unlawful show of authority, not submitted to, constituted a
seizure.' 70 The Court quickly dismissed this contention announcing
that "[tihe word 'seizure' readily bears the meaning of a laying on of
hands or application of physical force to restrain movement ....,,171
Such statements shed light on the Court's earlier discussions regarding
the dictionary definitions of seizure and the common-law definitions
of seizure and arrest. The Court reasoned that if seizure must "readily
bear the meaning of ... force to restrain" then a seizure based upon
show of authority must, by nature of the word seizure, include
restraint or control. 72 However, the opinions in Chesternut and
Mendenhall unequivocally state that a seizure, based upon a show of
authority, could be effectuated through "language or a tone of voice
indicating that compliance ... might be compelled ' 1 73 or when police
"command [a suspect] ... to halt.''1 74 Neither of the foregoing
examples can be equated with physical force. In fact, it would seem
that both of these examples of seizure would be less likely to have
restraining effect on a suspect then a head-on pursuit, as was the fact
1 75
in the Hodari D. case.
168. See supra note 161.
169. California v. Hodari D., II1 S. Ct. 1547, 1550 (1991); see Michigan v.
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574-75 (1988). Although the Court in Chesternut held that
no seizure occurred prior to this discarding of drugs, the court recognized several
forms of aggressive police conduct which could constitute a seizure, prior to physical
contact. Id. Following this logic, if the suspect in Chesternut had been seized,
evidence discarded following the seizure would have been a product of said seizure.
170. Hodari D., III S.Ct. at 1550 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967) to
show that seizure may occur based upon a show of authority).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1550-51 (noting that a policeman yelling "stop" could not constitute
a seizure because mere words do not constitute a seizure).
173. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
174. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988).
175. California v. Hodari D., 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1549 (1991).
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The Court in HodariD. avoided the examples in Mendenhall and
Chesternut by holding that the opinions in those two cases are
inapplicable to the facts in Hodari D. 7 6 The Hodari D. Court
explained that the test set forth in Mendenhall does not "state a
sufficient condition for seizure ... ."77 In no other opinion has any
justice stated, or speculated, that if the standards of the Mendenhall
test were met there might be a further, unannounced, test before there
can be a conclusion of a seizure. 7 8 The Hodari D. Court attempted
to explain this unannounced test by referring to its decision in
Chesternut.7 9 The HodariD. Court implied that had the police-citizen
encounter in Chesternut met the standards of the reasonable person
test, only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition to constitute a
seizure would have been met. 80 Yet the Court in Chesternut held that
the defendant in that case was not seized because the police had not
"activated a siren ... [or] commanded respondent to halt ... [or]
displayed ... weapons,"'' actions which might allow a reasonable
person to conclude that he was not free to leave. Presumably, had
the police in Chesternut performed such activities prior to actually
physically restraining the suspect, a seizure would have occurred.
In support of its proposition of the existence of a second test,
the Hodari Court cited to Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Chester176. Id. at 1551-52.

177. Id. at 1551. But see id. at 1559 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent
contended that:
Whatever else one may think of today's decision, it unquestionably represents a departure from earlier Fourth Amendment case law. The notion that
our prior case contemplated a distinction between seizures effected by
touching on the one hand, and show of force on the other hand, and that
all of our repeated descriptions of the Mendenhall test stated only a
necessary, but not sufficient condition for finding seizures in the latter
category, is nothing if not creative lawmaking.
Id.
178. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988); INS v. Delgado, 466
U.S. 210 (1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544 (1980); cf. California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1549, 1557 (1991)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority's conclusions regarding Mendenhall
and the reasonable person test was "novel").
179. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1551 (noting that the test in Mendenhall was not
met in Chesternut).
180. Id.
181. Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 575 (after explaining that the police conduct could
not have communicated to a reasonable person that they were not free to leave,
Justice Blackmun recited the above examples as illustrations of what the police did
not do).
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nut. 12 The Court's citation to Justice Kennedy's concurrence in
Chesternut is misleading at best.'1 3 In support of the contention that
Mendenhall states only a necessity for seizure, the Court seemingly
advocated Kennedy's position that "conduct [show of authority] does
not implicate the Fourth Amendment protections until it achieves a
restraining effect."''8 4 By embracing Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion in Chesternut, the Hodari D. Court clearly dismissed the
holding in the Chesternut case.' 5
Recall in Chesternut that both the state and the defendant
requested that the Court form a bright-line rule defining when a
seizure began.'8 6 Yet, the Chesternut Court rejected any bright-line
rule explaining that the reasonable person test was "necessarily imprecise" and sought to examine all the circumstances surrounding the
incident.8 7 Therefore, the Chesternut Court found it necessary, in
employing the reasonable person test, to look to whether the actions
of the police would have communicated a restraining effect.8 8 This is
quite different from Kennedy's assertion that the police actions must
"achieve a restraining effect." 8 9 Similarly, if the HodariCourt sought
consistency with the Chesternut opinion it should not have focused
on the point at which the pursuit achieved restraining effect upon
Hodari, but upon the point when the officer's conduct could have
communicated a restraining effect to Hodari.
182. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1551-52; see Abraham Abramovsky, Cutting to
the Chase, N.Y. L.J., May 30, 1991, at 3. "Justice Antonin Scalia's April opinion
in Californiav. Hodari D., echoes the concurring opinion"of Justice Anthony Kennedy
in the 1988 case of Michigan v. Chesternut, which he joined. Both opinions adopted

a narrow interpretation of the term 'seizure.' " Id.

183. See Clancy, supra note 16, at 640. "The 1988 decision Michigan v.
Chesternut seemed to extinguish any lingering doubts about whether the reasonable

person test commanded a majority view. However, the two newest members of the
Court, Justices Kennedy and Scalia, declined to apply the test, and focused instead
on whether a 'restraining effect had been achieved' . . . ." Id.
184. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 577 (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

185. See California v. Hodari D., 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1558-59 (1991) (Stevens, J.,

dissenting); LAFAVE, supra note 56, § 9.2(h), at 61 ("This later position [advocated
by the State of Michigan], which the Court rejected outright, is indistinguishable
from that which Justices Kennedy and Scalia mistakenly assert . . . ."); Clancy, supra
note 16, at 636 n.123.

186. Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 572 (explaining that the state requested a rule which
would only recognize seizure upon apprehension, whereas the defendant wanted all
chases to be considered a seizure); see supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
187. Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 573.

188. Id. at 572-75.

189. Id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that a seizure never occurs
until a restraining effect is achieved).
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While the Hodari D. Court found little precedential value in the
Mendenhall and Chesternut decisions, they did believe that Brower v.
County of Inyo' 90 was "quite relevant."' 91 HodariD. relied upon the
language in Brower that "[vliolation of the Fourth Amendment
requires an intentional acquisition of physical control."'19 2 Therefore,
a seizure would entail some form of control, or in light of Hodari
D., submission which could enable a police officer to exercise physical
control. By discounting the relevance of the Mendenhall and Chesternut decisions and instead employing the Brower decision, the Court
effectively announced that Brower set a new standard for analyzing
seizures. 193
Such a possibility is distressing for several reasons. First, the
Brower decision was a civil action for violation of civil rights brought
against the police department. 94 Second, the issue in Brower was
whether the pleadings of the decedents' estate were sufficient to
maintain a cause of action against the police department pursuant to
42 U.S.C. §1983. In Brower, dismissal of the estate's claim was
affirmed by the appellate court, which held that no seizure occurred
when the police lead the decedent, blindly, into an eighteen-wheel
truck being employed by the police as a roadblock. 195 The Supreme
Court in Brower reversed the appellate court, holding that the conduct
96
did constitute a seizure.
The Hodari Court cited to dicta in Brower which announced that
a seizure required "intentional acquisition of physical control."1 97 The
dicta of the Brower case was a response to a hypothetical used by the
appellate court. 19 The Court in Brower explained that in a case where

190. 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
191. HodariD., 111 S. Ct. at 1552.
192. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989); see supra note 95 and
accompanying text.
193. See Clancy, supra note 16, at 640-50. Regarding Brower, the author stated
that "in Brower, Kennedy and Scalia achieved what they set out to do in Chesternut:
eliminate chases from the lexicon of seizures." Id. at 645.
194. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 594 (1989).
195. Id. (The appellate court held that where there was no violation of Fourth
Amendment rights, there was no police liability.).
196. Id. at 598.
197. Hodari D., I II S. Ct. at 1552 (citing Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S.
593, 596 (1989)).
198. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 595-96 (1989). The appellate
court's hypothetical, which according to the Court does not constitute a seizure,
involved a "pursuing police car [which] sought to stop the suspect only by the show
of authority represented by flashing lights and continuing pursuit." Id.
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the car crashes on its own, no seizure occurred because the crash
would be the result of an accidental effort, not an intentional governmental intrusion. 99 Unlike Brower, the facts in Hodari D. made it
clear that the defendant's discarding of the cocaine was not an
accidental event. Quite the opposite is actually true. Hodari's discarding of the cocaine was a direct result of Officer Pertoso's pursuit and
impending capture of him. 200 Therefore, since the cocaine in Hodari
D. was discarded due to the pursuit, and not an accidental event, the
201
Brower decision can be distinguished from Hodari D.
It is true that Kennedy's opinion in Chesternut, and the dicta of
Brower, advocate the same rule used in deciding HodariD. However,
it is not the rule the Court had employed in previous decisions
concerning the criminal seizure of a person. 20 2 Moreover, it is not the
rule Justice Stewart first set forth in Mendenhall.20 The opinion in
Hodari D. replaced the reasonable person test with a "simpler"
199. Id. at 596-97. The Brower Court's own hypothetical tends to discount the
many intervening circumstances which occur to cause an accident (i.e., speed of car,
condition of road); see State v. Lemon, 568 A.2d 48 (Md. 1990).
A significant part of the Court's opinion [in Brower v. County of Inyo]
was with respect to the intentional acquisition of physical control as a
characteristic of a seizure, as distinguished from accidental or unintentional
control. Any implication that actual physical control is required must be
read in the frame of reference of the Court's concern with that characteristic.
We do not see in the Court's declaration, even if not dicta ...

that there

must be an actual laying on of the hands and a taking of a person.
Id. at 53.
200. In re Hodari D., 265 Cal. Rptr. 79, 85 (1989).
201. The Court in Hodari D. also makes reference to the decision in Hester v.
United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). In Hester, the defendants contended that the
seizure of several whiskey bottles was illegal, therefore rendering the evidence obtained
inadmissible. Id. at 57-59. However, the issue in HodariD. was whether Hodari was
seized, not whether the cocaine was illegally seized, thereby rendering subsequently
obtained evidence inadmissible as a fruit of the illegal seizure. California v. Hodari
D., III S. Ct. 1547 (1991). Since recent decisions have provided the Court with a
formula for determining when a seizure of a person occurred it seems illogical for
the Court to have searched back over sixty years for a definition. Therefore, the
formula in Hester, which applied to a seizure of whiskey, is not applicable to the
seizure of a person.
202. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988); INS v. Delgado, 466
U.S. 210 (1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544 (1980). For a discussion of the preceding decisions see supra notes 4997 and accompanying text.
203. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 ("[A] [reasonable] person has been 'seized'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not
free to leave.").
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analysis. 2 04 Under Hodari D. seizure occurs either by way of physical
control, or when the subject yields to a show of authority. What a
reasonable person faced with a show of authority believes regarding
her freedom to walk away is irrelevant. If the person feels they are
not free to leave and proceeds to yield, a seizure will occur. If a
person does not feel free to leave, yet proceeds to leave, there will be
no seizure until the subject yields.20 5 The focus in Hodari D. is not
the objective reasonable person, as in Mendenhall, but whether the
suspect actually yields to a show of authority .20 Therefore, when a
citizen's privacy is restricted or offended by an illegal display of
governmental force, the citizen must submit to the illegal force in
order to maintain their Fourth Amendment protections. This is necessary to effectuate the Court's command that "compliance with
police orders [presumably even unlawful orders] to stop should ...
be encouraged."

20 7

V.

PRACTICAL IMPACT

Under the analysis set forth in HodariD., if a person is physically
restrained, a seizure has occurred. However, no reasonable person
would feel free to leave while being restrained by the police; the
Mendenhall test is unnecessary given such a setting. 20 Furthermore,
204. California v. Hodari, 1 I S. Ct. 1547, 1559 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that both physical restraint and show of authority with submission are
seizures because the police have gained control, not because a reasonable person feels
he is not free to walk away; therefore, the moment a seizure occurs does not depend
on the reasonable beliefs of the subject as to the conduct of the police, but solely
upon the conduct of the police); see also People v. Arangure, 282 Cal. Rptr. 51, 54
(1991) ("[The Hodari] rule effectively moots the foregoing Mendenhall-Chesternut
analysis . .

").

205. The dissent in Hodari D., noting that people do sometimes flee from the
police, thereby not responding to a show of authority, stated that "[t]he Court ...

mistakenly assumes that innocent residents have no reason to fear the sudden
approach of strangers." Hodari D., I 11 S. Ct. at 1553 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
206. See, e.g., id. at 1559-60 ("[T]he point at which the interaction between
citizen and police officer becomes a seizure occurs, not when a reasonable citizen
believes he or she is no longer free to go, but rather, only after the officer exercises
control over the citizen."); see also Ira Mickenberg, Criminal Rulings Granted the
State Broad New Power, NAT'L. L.J., Aug. 19, 1991, at 510 ("HodariD., however,
seems to replace this definition [reasonable person test] with a new standard, holding
that a person has not been seized until police have forced the person to submit to
their authority by means of physical contact.").
207. HodariD., 111 S. Ct. at 1551.
208. See, e.g., Clancy, supra note 16, at 627 ("[Tlhe reasonable person test was
designed to be a tool to determine when a seizure takes place in situations short of
a physical restraint.").
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if a person is confronted with a show of authority and submits, a

seizure has occurred. 209 Finally, if a person is met with a show of
authority, yet the person does not submit, a seizure will never occur. 210

The practical impact for the citizen is a restriction of their move-

ment. 211 In Terry, the Supreme Court held that a police officer need
only have reasonable suspicion to perform a brief investigatory stop.2t 2
The Terry Court recognized that such a procedure may require less

than probable cause as long as the procedure is limited in order to
dispel or confirm the officer's suspicions. 213 After HodariD. however,

a police officer can pursue a citizen with no reasonable suspicion or
probable cause. If the citizen flees from the pursuit, no protections
under the Fourth Amendment will exist until either physical control
or submission occurs. 214 The citizen, therefore, is required to submit

to an unlawful show of police authority before constitutionallyguaranteed protections can be invoked. 215 Effectively, the Hodari D.

holding may "isolate from constitutional scrutiny the initial stages of

' '21 6
the contact between [sic] the policeman and the citizen.
If the Hodari D. holding proves to "isolate the initial stages" of

police-citizen contact, it may mean greater power to the police. The
209. The Hodari Court must have believed that if the test set forth in Mendenhall
is to continue to be part of the seizure analysis, first it must be determined what a
reasonable person would have believed, then, upon the belief they were not free to
leave, the person must yield. But see supra note 204 for a discussion of the proposition
that Hodari D. eliminates the Mendenhall test.

210. Id. at 1552 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In its decision, the Court assumes
•.. that a police officer may now fire his weapon at an innocent citizen and not
implicate the Fourth Amendment - as long as he misses his target.").
211. See generally Maclin, supra note 4.
212. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28-31 (1967).
213. See id. at 30.
214. See, e.g., Abraham Abramovsky, Cutting to the Chase, N.Y. L.J., May
30, 1991, at 3.
Under the facts of Hodari, a suspicionless, hot pursuit of neighborhood
youths - which all nine Justices agreed was unsupported by a legal basis
to stop or arrest - could not qualify as "inoffensive contact between a
member of the public and the police." Yet, under Justice Scalia's dialectic,
it would pass constitutional muster, in that a chase does not become a
seizure until its consummation.

Id.

215. Hodari D., 111 S.Ct. at 1562 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Today's qualification of the Fourth Amendment means that innocent citizens may remain 'secure in
their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures' only at the discretion

of the police.").
216. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1967). In keeping with the other
language of Terry, it is not unreasonable to believe that the word "contact," as used
in the textual quote, can be defined as both physical contact and a show of authority.
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Hodari D. Court stressed in its opinion that "[s]treet pursuits always

place the public at some risk, and compliance with police orders to

stop should therefore be encouraged. ' 21 7 However, the Fourth
Amendment grants "the right of people to be secure" from unreasonable governmental intrusions.2" 8 This right is certainly weakened

when people may be secure from only unreasonable restraining intru-

sions, yet have no right to be free from unreasonable demands to
stop.
The Hodari D. Court stated that "[u]nlawful orders will not be
deterred, moreover, by sanctioning through the exclusionary rule those
of them that are not obeyed." 21 9 Maybe the best course of action for
a citizen would then be to ignore all police orders whether they be
unreasonable or not. Presumably, if the order is ignored the police
will pursue the individual. If the individual is then seized, and the
officer lacks the requisite suspicion, then any incriminating evidence
uncovered could be inadmissible.2 20 If the officer does have the
requisite suspicion and the citizen possesses incriminating evidence,
then he is in no worse a position than had he submitted to the officer's
original order. 22' Furthermore, the holding in Hodari D. may leave
the police confused as to what conditions constitute submission to a

217. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1551. The Court goes on to state that "[o]nly a

few of those orders, we must presume, will be without adequate basis . .
218. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

"

Id.

219. HodariD., 111 S.Ct. at 1551.
220. Although walking away may be a possibility, the Supreme Court seems to
be on the verge of preventing such a situation described above. Responding to the
state's concession that the pursuit was unlawful, the Court questioned whether "it
would be unreasonable to stop . . .young men who scatter in panic upon the mere

sighting of the police." Id. at 1549 n.1. Such a proposition, the Court claimed,
"arguably contradicts proverbial common sense." Id. These statements were followed
by a cite to Proverbs 28:1 "The wicked flee when no man pursueth." Id. The dissent
responded to the majority's assertion by describing it as "ivory-towered analysis of
the real world for it fails to describe the experience of many residents, particularly if
they are members of a minority." Hodari D., at 1553 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
see also Cauthen v. United States, 592 A.2d 1021, 1028 (D.C. 1991) (Steadman, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that the majority's assertion in Hodari D. can be read to

sanction the proposition that flight at the sight of police could be reasonable
suspicion); Abramovsky, supra note 214 ("it is reasonable to predict that the next
Supreme Court case will test whether the retreat of a citizen from the police officer's
approach amounts to reasonable suspicion for the purposes of either a Terry stop or
a chase.").
221. In Hodari D., had Hodari kept the cocaine in his pocket it would have
been discovered after an unlawful seizure, and would have been considered a fruit
of that unlawful seizure.
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show of force. 222 Consequently, the holding in Hodari D. will clearly
have an impact on the police-citizen encounter. While it could serve
to further undermine the authority of law enforcement, the more
practical conclusion is that the holding "will encourage unlawful
displays of force that will frighten countless innocent citizens into
surrendering whatever privacy rights they may still have.' '22 Therefore, effective law enforcement can best be achieved if the police
chase all citizens whom they believe show a propensity towards
criminal activity, yet do not possess enough of the criminal characteristics which would enable the police to perform an investigatory
stop. If the citizen flees, then the police will posses the necessary
reasonable suspicion to stop the fleeing citizen from an initially
22
unlawful pursuit. A
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Court in Hodari D. held that a pursuit of an individual is
not a seizure, thereby denying the citizens of the protections under
the Fourth Amendment. Only when the individual yields to a governmental pursuit may that citizen enjoy the protections of the Fourth
Amendment. The Hodari opinion refused to recognize the right to
Fourth Amendment protections at any point prior to submission, no
matter how intrusive the pursuit may have been. The reaction that
the Hodari D. opinion assigns to the feeling of constraint is submission.
Furthermore, the Hodari D. opinion effectively eliminates the
notion that Fourth Amendment protections are entitled when the
governmental intrusion reaches a level enabling a reasonable person
to conclude that they are not free to leave. The rights granted under
the Fourth Amendment are thereby dependent upon the citizen's
submission to a governmental intrusion. Therefore, the citizenry's
perceptions regarding their freedom of movement are irrelevant. The
only perception the Court acknowledged under the HodariD. analysis
222. Hodari D., Ill S. Ct. at 1560 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that the
holding will hinder police in deciding whether the encounter constituted a seizure,
and asserting that much litigation will arise as to what actions are submission).
223. Id. at 1561.
224. See, e.g., United States v. DeLeon, 942 F.2d 794 (Table) (text on Westlaw)
(9th Cir. 1991) (employing the reasoning of HodariD. that pursuit does not constitute
a seizure, however, flight from pursuit gives the government agent reasonable
suspicion to seize); United States v. Koenings, 951 F.2d 364 (Table) (Text on Westlaw)
(9th Cir. 1991) (flight from police pursuit was one of the factors used to decide that
the police had reasonable suspicion to arrest and search the defendant's car).
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is one which requires the submission to a governmental intrusion.
This analysis renders the test espoused by Justice Stewart in Mendenhall irrelevant. Although the Court in Hodari D. purported to leave
the Mendenhall test intact, courts attempting to determine the point
of a seizure will have no need to examine what a reasonable person
perceives given this opinion. In examining whether a person has been
seized, courts will only need to look to the actions the person took
when confronted with the governmental intrusion; thereby, rendering
the citizenry's reasonable beliefs regarding their freedom of movement
immaterial.
The Court in Hodari D. refused to issue an opinion which
sanctioned flight from an unlawful show of authority. Admittedly,
there is little doubt that this will provide for effective law enforcement.2 5 However, this assertion is an uncompelling reason to restrict
the citizenry's rights.22 6 In a final plea against the HodariD. decision,
Justice Stevens wrote:
Some sacrifice of freedom always accompanies an expansion
in the executives unreviewable law enforcement powers. A
court more sensitive to the purposes of the Fourth Amendment
would insist on greater rewards to society before decreeing the
sacrifice it makes today ....
The Court's immediate concern
with containing criminal activity poses a substantial ... threat
to values that are fundamental and enduring. 227
PATRICK
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225. But see Florida v. Bostick, Il1 S. Ct. 2382, 2389 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("[T~he effectiveness of a law enforcement technique is not proof of its

constitutionality.").

226. Hodari D., Il1 S. Ct. at 1562 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
227. Id.

